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1   Introduction 
Cloud computing delivers computing services from large, highly virtualized network environments to 
many independent users, using shared applications and pooled resources.  One may distinguish between 
Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), in which case software is offered on-demand through the Internet by the 
provider and it is parameterized remotely (like for example on-line word processors, spreadsheets, Google 
Docs and others), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), in which case customers are allowed to create new 
applications that are remotely managed and parameterized and the platform offers tools for development 
and computer interface restructuring (like for example Force, Google App Engine and Microsoft Azure 
[29]) and Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), in which case virtual machines, computers and operating 
systems may be controlled and parameterized remotely. Cloud computing can also be classified based on 
their deployment models; public cloud, where everyone may register and use the services, private cloud - 
that is accessible through a private network - and partner cloud - that offers services to specific 
partners/users. A hybrid cloud is a combination of private/internal and external cloud resources that 
enables outsourcing of noncritical functions whilst keeping the remainder internal. Modern virtualized 
cloud environments promote the aspects of elasticity and resource transparency that are enabled by 
service and Virtual Machine (VM) migration. The majority of cloud management software ensures that a 
VM retains its network identity and connectivity by initiating a “live” or “cold” migration strategy. 
“Live” migration allows to move the entire running VM (i.e. its active memory and execution state) from 
one physical node of the cloud to another without significant downtime as an effective newline resource-
management strategy empowering workload balancing. On the other hand, a VM should be powered off 
before migration during the so called “cold” migration. Migration is a key feature of cloud environments 
that introduces novel security and resilience challenges [23]. There are several standards that refer to 
secure cloud computing. They require that anomaly activity should be detected in a timely manner and 
potential impact of events should be analyzed. A baseline of network operations and expected data flows 
for users and systems should be established and managed whereas attack targets and methods have to be 
evaluated regarding their potential impact. Event data should be aggregated and correlated from multiple 
sources and sensors. Incident alert thresholds should be established. An anomaly detector applied to 
network traffic visible at the cloud infrastructure level could be misled by the effect of migration on that 
traffic in two ways. First, legitimate migration could be misidentified as an anomaly. Second, migration 
could occur simultaneously with a genuine challenge, and thus mask its detection [38]. Furthermore, the 
elasticity also generates a huge volume of monitoring data (big-data problem), which can be considered 
as overhead for underlying detection mechanisms. Due to these issues anomaly detection in the cloud is a 
challenging area of active research and several software tools have been developed to this end [1]. These 
systems aim at identifying anomalous events with respect to normal system behavior. Such systems 
assume a model of normal behavior and issue alerts whenever operational characteristics deviate from the 
prescribed “normal” behavior making a suitable assumption that such changes are frequently caused by 
malicious or disruptive events. Anomaly detection techniques for cloud environments are still evolving 
due to the fact that the topic presents several challenging aspects as discussed earlier.  
An hybrid NN-expert system in artificial intelligence is a computer system that emulates the decision-
making ability of a human expert. Subsystems include the inference engine and the knowledge base. The 
knowledge base represents facts and rules. The inference engine applies the rules to the known facts to 
deduce new facts. Inference engines can also include explanation and debugging abilities. Such hybrid 
systems include Neural Networks [14], blackboard systems, belief (Bayesian) networks, case-based 
reasoning and rule-based systems and can be implemented in a variety of ways. Anomalies, on the other 
hand, are classified as point anomalies – if an individual data instance can be considered as anomalous 
with respect to the rest of the data – contextual anomalies – if an information occurrence is anomalous in 
a precise context – and collective anomalies – if collections of data instances are anomalous with respect 
to the entire data set. Table 1 summarizes various anomaly scenarios and their types related to cloud 
implementations. Generally there are many anomaly detection techniques: Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) [31], clustering-based methods [31,49], Naive Bayesian approaches [50] and Expectation-
Maximization Gaussian Mixture Models [9]. Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) have been used for detection 
as well (see, for example, [36]). Ordered sequences, i.e. continuous and discontinuous pattern matching, 
constitute an alternative proposition [2]. A survey of anomaly detection approaches is given in [26,32]. 
Several approaches for anomaly detection have been tested within the framework of current EU projects 
[19]. Most of the above mentioned techniques require clustering high dimensional data addressing, thus, 
specific challenges inherent in cloud operation. This is really a challenging task since all sampling points 
tend to become outliers as dimensionality increases and clustering algorithms falter. Full space clustering 
becomes computationally expensive and inefficient since it is easy to miss clusters. A number of 
approaches to subspace clustering have been proposed in the past two decades. A review of the methods 
from the data-mining community can be found in [30]. One may also see [46] for subspace clustering 
techniques. They include matrix factorization-based algorithms [42], algebraic-geometric generalized 
PCA [47,27], Gaussian Mixture Models [21] and mixtures of probabilistic PCA [45], locally linear 
manifold clustering [16] and sparse subspace clustering  (SSC) [13] as well as local density approaches as 
data clouds [3] and dimension induced clustering [15]. The SECCRIT Consortium has developed an 
architectural framework for deploying critical infrastructure services in the cloud, which provides a basis 
for the development of our Cloud Resilience Management Framework. Several architectures for anomaly 
detection based upon the cloud have been investigated. We can apply D2R2 to the SECCRIT architectural 
framework to provide a resilience view (Fig. 1), see for example [39].  At the physical layer, the cloud 
infrastructure operator has access to physical nodes and the network, which can be monitored to inform 
the detection process. The operator can also reconfigure these devices, in response to detected challenges 
using policies. In a cloud infrastructure, D2R2 may exist as monitoring and reconfiguration points on 
physical hosts and networks as well as on some virtual components. Resilience managers and detectors 
need not exist on any physical equipment used directly to provide virtual resources to the above layer. At 
the tenant infrastructure layer, the tenant has access to VMs, and possibly virtual taps on VNs, which can 
inform detection. In response to challenges, the tenant may reconfigure the hosted machines, and some 
functionality of the virtual networks might also be exposed. Thus, tenant-infrastructure D2R2 is spread 
across components visible to this layer. Within the inner D2R2 loop, some interaction between these layers 
may exist in the form of events and reconfigurability exposed by the lower layer.  
 
The contribution of this paper consists mainly of presenting a novel approach of producing Self-
Organizing Feature Maps (SOFMs) of sets of ordered structures. The structures within a set may contain 
binary as well as vector components and may be considered as parameterizations of distinctive subspace 
clusters of a distributed high dimensional input space. The input space entails measurements from the 
entire cloud that pertain to normal operation. Subspace measurements refer to a set of cloud servers and 
local traffic monitoring. Section 2.1 deals with the challenges for anomaly detection in cloud 
environments and the modular architecture of a state-of-the-art platform for such a system. Literature 
references for several approaches are cited. Section 3 outlines the basic notions of subspace clustering 
and presents the well-known algorithm of Expectation Maximization (EM) for Gaussian Mixture Model 
and non-parametric representations of clusters based upon Reduced (aggregate) ordered sets. Each 
ordered set can be regarded as a granule of information with internal structure featuring scalar, vectorial 
as well as categorical attributes [34]. Section 4 elaborates upon the representation of subspace clusters by 
the nodes of a SOFM, defines the structure of multiset inputs for binary and vectorial measurements and 
describes distance measures between ordered mulisets based on the Cross-Order Distance matrix. The 
details of the proposed algorithm and its training are given in Section 5. Numerical simulations for 
structured measurements pertaining to anomaly detection in cloud environment are illustrated in Section 
6. This work is concluded by discussing results of anomaly detection which are obtained by the 
application of the proposed method and provides suggestions for further research.  
2   The Structure Of A Cloud-Based Anomaly Detection NN Hybrid System   
2.1 Knowledge base and the neighborhood model– Causes of Anomalies   
 
An anomaly detection system is formally considered as an information system [11], which can be written 
as a quadruple IS=(U, A, V, f), where: U is a non-empty finite set of objects, called a universe, A is a non-
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empty finite set of features, V is a union of feature domains such that 𝑉 =∪𝑎∈𝐴 𝑉𝑎 where Va denotes the 
value domain of feature a, 𝑓: 𝑈 × 𝐴 → 𝑉  is an information function such that 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛼) ∈ 𝑉𝛼  
 
for 
every  𝛼 ∈ 𝐴 and 𝑥 ∈ 𝑈. 𝑓(𝑥, 𝛼) can be defined upon scalar, vectorial or  binary-word attributes. One may 
split set A of features into two subsets 𝐶 ⊂ 𝐴  and  𝐷 = 𝐴 − 𝐶
 
conditional set of features and decision (or 
class) features respectively. The condition features represent measured features of the objects, while the 
decision features are a posteriori outcome of classification. The value difference metric (VDM) was 
introduced by [41] to provide an appropriate distance function  D(x,y) on nominal attributes. A simplified 
version (without the weighting schemes) of the VDM is defined as follows:                                            
𝑉𝐷𝑀 = ∑ 𝑑𝑓𝑓∈𝐹 (𝑥𝑓 , 𝑦𝑓)  𝑤here F is the set of all features in the problem domain, and x and y are any 
two objects between which distance is calculated. For any feature 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹, 𝑑𝑓(𝑥𝑓 , 𝑦𝑓) is defined as the 
distance between the probability density of object x on feature f at xf , P(xf), and the probability density of 
object y on feature f at yf , P(yf). A system for anomaly detection recognizes two possible decision features 
{normal traffic, anomaly}. We try to determine a set of  objects {𝑥1, 𝑥2 , 𝑥3 …… } ∈ 𝑈
 
- along with their 
corresponding subspaces {𝐵(𝑥1), 𝐵(𝑥2), 𝐵(𝑥3)…… } ⊆ 𝐶
  
- that provide a representation of class normal 
traffic as a superposition of local clusters defined upon various feature metrics. Anomalies are due to 
malicious activities or application-level malfunctioning.  
 
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is a software application or device that implements an expert system 
and monitors the activities of a network for policy violations or malicious activities. It generates reports to 
the management system. A number of systems may try to prevent an intrusion attempt but this is neither 
required nor expected from a conventional monitoring system. The main focus of Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention Systems (IDPS) is to identify possible incidents, log information about them and report 
attempts. Organizations use IDPS for other purposes as well, like - for example - identifying problems 
with security policies, deterring individuals and documenting existing threats from infringing security 
policies. IDPS have become an essential addition to the security infrastructure of nearly every 
organization. Various techniques can be used to detect intrusions. 
 
 
Public and private clouds can be affected both by malicious attacks and infrastructure failures (like for 
example power outages). Such events may have an impact upon cloud operations.  The authors in [8] 
attempt to develop an understanding of the challenges faced by customers of an Infrastructure-as-a-
Service (IaaS) cloud, along with their experience in resolving related problems. Their work is based on 
actual user problems and everyday practices as reported to the open support forum of a large IaaS cloud 
provider. They found that - exempt from problems related to application-level malfunctioning - the 
observed problems are closely related to the introduction of virtualization, i.e. connectivity issues, virtual-
image management, performance, poor isolation between users, hardware degradation and others. These 
findings are supported by suplamental literature documenting virtualization-specific attacks by attackers 
gaining control over installed VMs, (like for example, DKSM [4] and “bluepill” [37]). 
 
Cloud providers usually install anomaly detection among other detection mechanisms [40] in order to 
tackle these challenges However, the increasing size and complexity of applications – along with the 
large scale of data centers in which they operate - make anomaly detection extremely challenging. Each 
computer server hosts hundreds of VMs, and each VM hosts hundreds of application processes resulting 
in very large monitoring metrics which may obscure detection. Determining applicable metrics in order to 
achieve efficient detection is another challenge. A metric of high dimensionality may yield poor detection 
results; it is complex as well as computationally expensive. Dynamic invocation of VMs, VM migration, 
frequent installations and removals of applications result in an ever-changing workload pattern. These 
variations in workload make it extremely difficult to detect and identify anomalies. Extracting knowledge 
from data streams in real-time or almost real-time is essential in order to avoid failures. Executions of 
remediation and recovery strategies have to be prompt. Inherent properties of cloud-computing make 
anomaly detection complex and challenging. 
 
 
2.2 State-of-the-art Anomaly Detection in The Cloud 
 
Anomaly detection in the context of virtualized data centers is a rather new research problem. An 
anomaly-based technique to detect intrusions at different layers of the cloud was proposed in [17]. 
However, it was not sufficiently demonstrated how to operationally apply such a technique. In [22], the 
authors propose a multi-level approach, which provides fast detection of anomalies discovered in the 
system logs of each guest OS. One of its disadvantages is the apparent lack of scalability, since it requires 
increasingly more resources under high system workload. Tree-Augmented Naive (TAN) Bayesian 
network is used in PREPARE in order to predict online anomalies and proactively take prevention actions 
[43].  
Recent approaches tend to combine flexible scalable analytics and Monitoring-as-a-Service (MaaS) for 
next generation monitoring and anomaly detection systems. Such systems implement real-time anomaly 
detection as well as continuous and distributed pattern analysis [6,25]. Furthermore anomaly detection 
methods may be classified as parametric ones [44] and non-parametric ones [35]. Parametric approaches 
adopt simple statistical models for anomalous and background traffic in time domain. Model parameters 
are estimated in real time and there is no need for a long training phase or manual parameter training. 
Such examples include spectral methods [18,20] as well as multiple and sequential hypothesis testing 
(like for example sequential probability ratio tests SPRT tests combined with bivariate Parameter 
Detection Mechanism (bPDM) [48]. Non-parametric methods do not assume an underling model but 
rather depend upon the inherent structure of the data and composite indicators (see for example the 
CUSUM algorithm [7] as well as Shewhart charts based upon Mann-Whitney statistics and the Wilcoxon 
Signed-Rank Test). The literature on composite indicators offers several examples of aggregation 
techniques. The most used are additive techniques that range from summing up to aggregating weighted 
normalised indicators. Yet, additive aggregations imply requirements and properties, both of the 
indicators and of the associated weights, which are often not desirable and, at times, difficult to meet or 
burdensome to verify. To overcome these difficulties the literature proposes other, and less widespread, 
aggregation methods such as multiplicative (e.g. geometric) aggregations or non-compensatory 
aggregations, such as the multi-criteria analysis [28].  
 
2.3 Virtualized Architecture of a Cloud Based Anomaly Detection System Based on Mining And 
Clustering Approaches 
 
Anomaly Detection Systems in the cloud can be modeled as distributed information systems which are 
implemented as Network-Function Virtualizations (NFN) (which use the technologies of IT virtualization 
in order to virtualize entire classes of network node functions into building blocks). Such building blocks 
may connect, or chain together, in order to create communication services. Clustering of the sets of 
measurements pertaining to such information systems are implemented using the aforementioned 
techniques (SOFM, neural networks, EM-GMM). The attributes of the sets of measuremants comprise a 
long list of scalar, vector and binary-word features. One may use a set of local clusters to indicate normal 
operation. Local subspace distributions of measurements upon conditional attributes are used to 
represented clusters. One may use one representative set of measurements for a cluster or two 
representative sets of measurements or more. The subspaces which are defined upon conditional attributes 
may vary depending upon the representative measurement. Anomalies are detected as outliers of such an 
expert  database.  
 
Virtualized network functions (VNF) consist of one or more VM running different software and 
processes, on top of standard high-volume servers. A reference architecture used in a cloud based 
anomaly detection system divides activities in a cloud environment into four layers (see Fig. 1.a). 
Anomaly detection gets input from network and system activity, which is measurable at the physical 
(cloud-infrastructure provider) layer, which consists of physical networks and machines, and has an 
external view of system activity in VMs. Additionally, network activity can be measured in the tenant-
infrastructure layer by monitoring traffic on virtual networks. Tenants running anomaly detectors on VMs 
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accessing these networks implement such a modular architecture. The proposed approach carries out 
distributed sampling at various cloud sites and assigns a structured set of local measurements to a specific 
server/client connected to the cloud. The block diagram of the proposed approach based on such an 
architecture is illustrated in Fig. 1.b. It consists of six (6) algorithmic steps. Structured sets of 
measurements throughout the cloud are ordered according to their similarity and their VDM distance 
from each other in a subsequent step of the algorithm. We distinguish between orders pertaining to 
normal and abnormal (anomalous) network traffic. An ordered set of measurements featuring dissimilar 
distribution over the VDM distance may be indicative of an anomaly. As a final step one may compare 
the ordered set with ordered sets of measurements pertaining to normal operation (which are used as 
reference sets). The ordered sets used as references are the nodes of a trained Self-Organizing-Feature-
Map (SOM) for normal cloud operation.  
3    Different Inference Engines For Subspace Clustering – Representing Clusters as Ordered Sets 
of Features   
All subspace clustering methods can be used for determining clusters of measurements indicating normal 
operation by assuming that a subspace corresponds to selected features (as defined by the mesurements  
taken from the servers connected to the cloud). VDM distance are used. The proposed approach is 
intended as a non-parametric alternative of such algorithms as the Expectation Maximization algorithm 
for Gaussian Mixture Models (EM-GMMs) [12]. The basic idea of the EM algorithm is to estimate an 
updated model if the probability of the new model is greater than or equal to the previous estimate. The 
new model then becomes the initial model for the next iteration and process is repeated until some 
convergence threshold is reached. One may consider the problem of representing a collection of data 





1}{ x  be a given set of points drawn from an unknown 
union of subspaces 𝑆𝑖 = {𝐱 ∈ 𝑅
𝐷𝑖𝑛: 𝐱 = 𝛍 + 𝐔𝑖𝐲}, i=1,…m, where 𝛍𝑖 ∈ 𝑅
𝐷𝑖𝑛 is an arbitrary point in 
subspace Si.  Should G(x; ) stand for the probability density function of a Din-dimensional Gaussian 
with mean  and covariance matrix , then 𝑝(𝑥) = ∑ 𝜋𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝐺(𝑥; 𝛍𝑖 , 𝐔𝑖𝐔𝑖
T + σ𝑖
2𝐈)) and ∑ 𝜋𝑖
𝑚
𝑖=1 = 1  where 
parameter ι, called the mixing proportion, represents the a priori probability of drawing a point from 
subspace Si). The ML estimates of the parameters of this mixture model can be found using expectation 
maximization (EM) during normal traffic conditions. Anomaly detection is carried out by performing the 
expectation step during anomalous network operation. Gaussian distributions may overlap as illustrated in 
Fig. 2a. This feature is useful in cases in which a specific state of the network is represented by a complex 
subspace in the domain of the measurements. Alternative approaches for representing distributions of data 
are the non-parametric ones. Such an approach used in the context of this research for comparison 
purposes is based upon the concept of data density [3]. It requires a small amount of data namely the 
mean of all data samples and a scalar product quantity calculated dynamically over time that indicates the 









 . Obviously index 
dα ranges from zero to one. The concept of this approach is illustrated in Fig. 2.b whereas training and anomaly 
detection are depicted in Fig. 2.c The following steps outline the aforementioned approach based on data 
density:  
 
 Estimate cluster centers derived from measurements indicating normal operation.  
 Set a goal (threshold 1) for the value of local data density. Start with one cluster and add one cluster 
at a time.  
 Stop adding clusters should you exceed a predetermined threshold. 
 Check a data distribution over the set of estimated cluster centers. 
 Should local data density fall below a pre-specified threshold (threshold 2) detect anomaly (positive 
indication). 
 
This approach is used for comparison purposes in Section 6.  
 
Our proposed non-parametric approach is based upon ordered sets of features as well as specific norms in 
order to represent. There is no universally accepted method for ordering multivariate data. Widely known 
multivariate ordering methods include [5]: 
 Marginal ordering (M-ordering) according to which feature vectors are ordered in each component 
independently. This scheme produces a set of ordered output vectors that is usually not the same as the 
set of input vectors.  
 Conditional ordering (C-ordering) according to which vectors are ordered based on the marginal 
ordering of one of their components. This scheme disregards the vectorial nature of the multichannel 
data. 
 Partial ordering (P-ordering) according to which vectors are partitioned into smaller groups that are 
then ordered. Despite its theoretical appeal, this scheme is computationally demanding. Since partial 
ordering is difficult to perform in more than two dimensions, it is not appropriate for three-component 
signals.   
 Reduced (aggregate) ordering (R-ordering) according to which the feature vectors are first reduced to 
scalar representatives using a suitable distance or similarity measure. The ordering of these scalars is 
then taken as the ordering of the corresponding vectors. This is the most common ordering scheme in 
the literature. 
The reduced ordering scheme is the most attractive and widely used in signal processing since it relies an 
overall ranking of the original set of input samples and the output is selected from the same set. The 
ordered sequence of scalar values D(1) ≤ D(2) ≤… ≤ D(i) ≤ …≤ D(N) for i = 1,2 … N implies the same 
ordering of the corresponding vectors xi , i.e. {x (1), x (2) … x (i) … x (N)}. R-ordering non-linear 
processing is based on the ordering of aggregated distances, i.e. 𝐷𝑖 = ∑ 𝑑(𝐱𝑖, 𝐱𝑗)
𝑁
𝑗=1  or aggregated 
similarities 𝐷𝑖 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐱𝑖, 𝐱𝑗)
𝑁
𝑗=1  [10]). Let us assume that 𝑥𝑘 ∈ 𝑆𝑛, where Sn consist of n 
repetitions of ordering experiments in normal or anomalous conditions, then it is assumed that 
lim
𝑆𝑛→∞
(Pr{𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑐}) = 1. This is condidered as a crisp ordering case. Nevertheless fuzzy outcomes 
are possible as well. One may define histograms upon such aggregate distances in order to distinguish 
between normal and anomalous traffic conditions. A bin by bin comparison of the probability 
distributions of the histograms over several value-difference metrics (VDMs) defines the neighbourhood-
based object outlier factor of x in S as 𝑁𝑂𝑂𝐹(𝑥𝑖) = ∑ 𝑉𝐷𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠(𝐱𝑖, 𝐱𝑗)𝑥𝑖,𝑥𝑗∈𝑆
𝑖≠𝑗
. Attributes that 
feature different histograms under normal and anomalous conditions should be selected. This implies that 
a selection of a set of value-difference metrics (VDMs) has to be made. One may arrange objects x in a 
neighbourhood according to their neighbourhood-based object outlier factor, i.e.                             
NOOF(x(1)) ≤ … ≤ NOOF(x(i)) ≤ …≤ NOOF(x(N)). A representation of overlapping clusters by 
reduced/aggregate ordered sets of points in 2-D is illustrated in Figs. 3. Histograms of the number of 
ordered vectors over distance are presented in Figs. 3b to 3d for the three distributions (for twenty 
ordered 2-D vectors). Lower order vectors tend to occupy the central part and most probable part of a 
local distribution.  
4 A Model of Self-Organizing Feature Map (SOFMs) Based on Reduced/Aggregate Ordering of 
Subspace Features   
4.1  Cloud Distributive Environment And Input Subspaces  
Sampling of binary and vector features is carried out over all host and client servers connected to the 
cloud for a time window [t1, t2] according to Fig. 4. Hence a ranking of all host and client servers 
connected to the cloud results after aggregate ordering of their feature vectors as explained in the previous 
paragraph. The spreading of feature vectors over a considerable distance range is indicative of an 
anomaly. Ordered sequences of feature vectors during normal cloud operation are clustered in nodes 
using a SOFM. Analyses using EM-GMM as well as local data densities are carried out for comparative 




The proposed approach (Fig. 1b) consists of sampling the cloud network during operation for small time 
windows [t1 t2], [t3 t4], [t5 t6] …… and selecting samples of the form 
𝑥𝑠(𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝛼𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠   𝛼𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃    𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒; [𝑡1 𝑡2]) 
where 𝑠 ∈ {𝑈: 𝑠 indicates a specific network condition}. The samples that correspond to host and client 
servers connected to the cloud are then ordered in ascending distance order according to the reduced 
ordering scheme described in Section 3. One may use selected members of the ordered set, like for 
example the first K members in order to train a SOFM as described in the sequel. Each vector represents a 
structured record comprising binary (or octal or hex) information along with multivalued data. The 
proposed approach is directly applicable to data-base records. SOFM clusters the universe knowledge of 
the anomaly detection hybrid system.  
4.2   Definition of the Cross-Order Distance Matrix Between Ordered Objects 
The Cross-Order Distance Matrix is defined along with a distance or similarity measure and a method of 
selecting the elements of the Cross-Order Distance Matrix (or operating upon them) in order to estimate 
the distance between two ordered sets of feature vectors, denoted as S={x (1), x (2) … x (i) … x (N)} 
where 𝑠 ∈ {𝑈: 𝑠 indicates an anomaly} and S’={x’ (1), x’(2) … x’ (i) … x’ (N)} 𝑠′ ∈
{𝑈: 𝑠′ indicates normal conditions}. Each element of the matrix is a value difference metric (VDM) as 
defined in Section 3. Thus,  





































A method (see Table 2) can be the sum of all elements of the Cross-Order Distance Matrix, its trace 
(defined as  𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒{𝐃𝑆𝑆′} = ∑ 𝑑(𝑥
𝑆(𝑘), 𝑥𝑆
′
(𝑘)𝑁𝑘=1 ), constant thresholding of all elements of the matrix 
(i.e. setting all elements below the threshold equal to zero and carry out summation over all non-zero 
elements), non-constant threholding using a rule such as  




𝑆′)),  (2) 
Let us consider sets of data that are indicative of the state of the cloud within time interval [t1 t2], i.e. 
𝑥𝑠(𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃, 𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 ……  ; [𝑡1 𝑡2]) and refers to some host/server 
connected to the cloud. Each node of the SOFM in Fig. 5 consists of an ordered set of samples {xS(1), 
xS(2), xS(3), xS(4)…} of feature vectors which corresponds to servers/hosts connected to the cloud. 
Distributions of measurements within an interval [t1 t2] may refer to binary (octal or hex) words of data - 
like for example IP addresses or ports - or scalar data, like for example packet sizes. Comparisons are 
carried out between ordered sets pertaining to interval [t’1 t’2], i.e. {xS’(1), xS’(2), xS’(3), xS’(4) … }, and 
ordered sets pertaining to interval [t1 t2], i.e. {xS(1), xS(2), xS(3), xS(4) … }. The Cross-Order Distance  
Matrix  between two such ordered  sets is defined in order to quantify the similarity-distance between 
them. 
 
Feature measurements during normal operation are clustered to the nodes of the SOFM according to some 
method applied upon the Cross-Order Distance Matrix. Measurements during an intrusion attack yield 
outliers of the trained SOFM and irregular histograms over VDM distances. The proposed approach may 
use all or selected rank samples during training.  
Ordering of the sample set is a necessary preprocessing step. We use value difference metric (VDM) in 
order to find the distance between xs’ and xs, i.e.                                                                       
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          (3) 
𝑑(𝑥𝑆′ , 𝑥𝑆; [𝑡1 𝑡2]) = {𝑑(𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑠
′), 𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑠); [𝑡1 𝑡2]) + 
                                      + 𝑑(𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑠
′), 𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑠); [𝑡1 𝑡2])              
+ 𝑑(𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠
′), 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠); [𝑡1 𝑡2]} = 
 
               = (
|𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑠
′) − 𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑠)|
|𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑠′)| + |𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑠)|
+ 
 
                                      +
|𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 (𝑠
′) − 𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑠)|
|𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑠′)| + |𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡(𝑠)|
+ 
 
                                                                       +
|𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠
′) − 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠)|
|𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠′)| + |𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑠)|
) 
 
One constructs the histogram over the lowest and the highest value of some object attribute in the training 
set in order to estimate the differences within interval [t1 t2] between servers and clients connected to the 
cloud for normal traffic conditions or anomalies. The differences between histograms are obtained using 
the Canberra distance over all histogram bins 
1








𝑙=1…𝐿 . For binary (or octal or hex) data within              
[t1 t2] one may use the Jaccard distance in Eq. 4, which measures the dissimilarity between sample sets. It 
is obtained by dividing the difference of the sizes of the union and the intersection of two sets by the size 
of the union, 
𝑑𝐽(𝑆, 𝑆
′) = 1 − 𝐽(𝑆, 𝑆′) =
|𝑆∪𝑆′|−|𝑆∩𝑆′|
|𝑆∪𝑆′|
.   (4) 
Distances that are obtained using some process upon the Cross-Order Distance Matrix should allow for 
discerning between ordered sets. Ordered sets of eight feature vectors are used, i.e sets consisting entirely 
of samples of measurements taken during normal operation and sets consisting of measurements taken 
during abnormal operation. Thresholded distance matrix allows for better results should one consider 
clustering anomalies using a SOFM. The distances between distributions A, B and C in Fig. 3.a for three 
different methods (i.e. “sum of all elements”, “trace-sum of diagonal zone elements” and “thresholded 
cross-order matrix”) are given in Table 2a. The values of distances are mean values of ten (10) instances 
of ordered sequences (featuring forty vectors/objects each). The variance internal is provided as well. A 
thresholded cross-order matrix appears to be the best choice whereas the sum of all elements fails to 
distinguish distribution B from A and B in some cases. Rough set theory [33] can be used as well in order 
to fuzzify the sums of elements within blocks of the Order Distance Matrix. The blocks may overlap or 
not. One can specify the order number as {low, medium, high}, i.e. the ordered members around the mean 
value, the middle ordered members and the higher ordered members (which are indicative of the outskirts 
of the information cluster granule). The rough set membership functions are defined upon the aggregate 
distance of ordered elements belonging to predefined subsets as µindex low order, µindex medium order and          
µindex high order  for possible distributions. One may consider, for example, the aggregate distance of the   
low-order elements in a set as the sum of all possible distances between pairs of elements in a predefined              
low-order subset, the aggregate distance of the median-order elements in a set as the sum of all possible 
distances between pairs of elements in a predefined median-order subset and the aggregate distance of the 
high-order elements in a set as the sum of all possible distances between pairs of elements in the                  
high-order subset. A binary relation defined upon a threshold can be used in order to determine the rough 
set membership functions for known distributions. Should the aggregate sum of similarities or distances 
between the subsets of ordered members fall within a lower and an upper threshold an indexlow (or 
indexmedium or indexhigh respectively) will assume the value of 1. Thus the values of the elements of the 
Order Distance Matrix can be regarded as rough functions ranging from zero (0) to one (1). The distance 
between different distributions is defined accordingly as a function of an initial first order estimate dXY 
and higher order estimets based upon the logical terms (1-µXa µYb), where X,Y stand for the different 
distibutions {A,B,C} and a, b stand for specific subsets, i.e. {low, medium, high}. Several choices are 
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available for the specific metric function to be employed [24]. Table 2b illustrates the outcome for the 
distributions in Fig. 3.a. The proposed SOFM can be trained for such a matrix metric. An estimation of 
the rough membership functions has to be made at start. A proper parametrization implies that should one 
draw the same number of elements from the very same underling distribution and, subsequently, order 
them in subsets, the resulting elements of the fuzzified distance matrix will obtain the value of zero (0).   
5   Anomaly Detection Using SOFMs with Multiset Inputs   
5.1  Outline of the Proposed Approach     
The proposed approach (Fig. 1b) consists of sampling the cloud network during abnormal conditions for 
small time windows [t1 t2], [t3 t4], [t5 t6] …… and selecting samples of the form  
𝑥𝑠(𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝛼𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠   𝛼𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃    𝛼𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑐𝑒/𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝛼𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒; [𝑡1 𝑡2])
for each server 𝑠 ∈ 𝑈. The samples that correspond to host and client servers connected to the cloud are 
then ordered in ascending distance order according to the reduced ordering scheme described in Section 
3. One may use selected members of the ordered set, like for example the first K members in order to 
train a SOFM as described in the sequel. Our proposed approach suggests training of local clusters using 
a SOFM. These clusters indicate normal operation. Anomalies are detected as local deviations from such 
clusters.  An initial check is carried out for irregular histogram distributions (which is indicative of an 
anomaly) before estimating the distance between the input vector and the nodes of the trained SOFM.   
 
5.2  Aggregating Multiset Inputs into Clusters – Training  
There are three basic steps involved in the application of the SOFM algorithm after initialization; namely, 
sampling, similarity matching and updating. Reduced/aggregated ordering of sample structured vectors 
within time windows can be regarded as an intermediate step. The sum of the aggregated distances 
between fields of an ordered structure (i.e. VDM distances) and a set of K feature vectors corresponding 
to a node of the SOFM is evaluated for all L nodes of the map. The Cross-Order Distance Matrix - as 
defined in Section 4 - is used to derive the sum of the aggregated distances. The result of the application 
of the selected method upon the Cross-Order Distance Matrix is used to determine the winning neuron. 
The aforementioned steps are described in detail as follows:  
1. Initialization of the partial sets. Choose the initial values for the weight vectors wj(0). Assume that 
each weight vector wj that corresponds to a neuron consists of a set of K representative host and client 
servers samples for the time window, i.e. 𝐰𝑗 = (𝐰𝑗,1 𝐰𝑗,2    …… 𝐰𝑗,K)  where index j equals           
1, 2,…, L (where L stands for the total number of neurons).  
2. Sampling.  Sample     cloud     and     server     conditions     for     time     window           [t1 t2], 𝐯(𝑡) =
(𝑥𝑈1(𝑡), 𝑥𝑈2(𝑡), 𝑥𝑈3(𝑡) …… ). 
3. Reduced/aggregated ordering of the samples corresponding to the host/client servers connected to the 





in such a way that                    
𝐷𝑘 = ∑ 𝑑(𝑥
𝑆(𝑘), 𝑥𝑆(𝑗)) ≤𝑁𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑘  𝐷𝑙 = ∑ 𝑑(𝑥
𝑆(𝑙), 𝑥𝑆(𝑗))𝑁𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑙      for k<l. VDM distance 
𝑑(𝑥𝑆(𝑙), 𝑥𝑆(𝑗)) aggregates the partial metrics between attribute fields                                                                     
within the objects, i.e. ∑ 𝑑𝛼𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝛼 (𝑓𝛼 (𝑥
𝑆(𝑙)), 𝑓𝛼 (𝑥
𝑆(𝑗))) where  𝛼 ∈
{𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠, 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠, 𝑠𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑒 & 𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑃 & 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠, 𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 …  }.  
4. Similarity Matching. Find the best-matching (winning) neuron 𝑖(𝑥𝑆1 , 𝑥𝑆2 , 𝑥𝑆3 ……  𝑥𝑆𝐿)  at time t by 
aggregating the distances between the samples in the set and the K vectors at each of the L nodes, i.e.   
𝑖(𝐯) = argmin
𝑗
(𝑚𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑑(𝐃(𝐰𝒊,𝒌, 𝐯(𝑡))))  
                      where 𝑗 = 1,2, …… , 𝐿                                                                     (5) 
 
5. Updating. Adjust the synaptic weight vectors of all neurons, using the update formula 
  
𝐰𝑗(𝑡 + 1)={
𝐰𝑗(𝑡) + 𝜂(𝑡) ([𝑥1
𝑠(𝑡) 𝑥2
𝑠(𝑡) 𝑥3
𝑠(𝑡)     … 𝑥𝑘




      where the ordered lowest K ranks of the training set are used, (t) is the learning-rate parameter and 
i(v)(t) is the neighbourhood function centred around the winning neuron. i(v)(t) is varied dynamically 
during learning for best results.      
6.  Continuation. Continue with Step 2 until no noticeable changes in the feature map are observed. 
Samples pertaining to abnormal and normal network conditions are presented to the SOFM after training 
in order to detect anomalies. Similarity matching is carried out as described in Step 4 of the algorithm 
summing all elements of a thresholded Cross-Order Distance Matrix. An anomaly is detected should the 
aggregate distance be higher than a threshold determined during training, i.e. anomalies are detected as 
outliers should the minimum distance from the nodes of the SOFM exceed a specified threshold. One 
assumes normal operation should minimum distance be lower than the threshold.  
6   Experimental Setup And Numerical Simulations 
We have evaluated our technique against network traces obtained from a controlled testbed resembling a 
cloud environment, featuring VM migration as a normal cloud operation, plus network attacks that should 
be regarded as anomalies. The testbed allows the traces to be labelled with ground truth, about both the 
expected anomalies and the presence of a migration. The testbed consists of two hosts, which serve as 
compute nodes running multiple VMs. Another host acts as a controller which initiates migrations and 
generates background traffic. A fourth host generates attack traffic. Each physical node runs KVM as 
virtualization infrastructure, and QEM provides hardware emulation. Migration is achieved with libvirt. 
Traces obtained at the virtual bridges are fed into detector to observe its reactions to normal/anomalous 
traffic. Data collector is composed of various scripts providing feature extraction and normalisation, 
which is achieved using tcpStat.c and featExract.pl scripts with configurable binning period. At the 
network level, the data collector collects traffic data through tcpdump1 from each host network at bridge 
interface. This traffic is then passed on to a Summary Extraction Script, which is based on libpcap and 
converts the traffic into normalised statistical properties on a per packet basis. We extracted both volume-
based features (e.g., count of bytes and packets) and distribution-based features (like the Shannon entropy 
of all values observed in the bin) in order to capture the dynamics of varying attack types. Network traces 
are split into 1-second bins for the experimental results that are presented in the sequel. A set of statistical 
properties (features) of the traffic in each bin is computed (Table 3) and  each feature vector with 
measurements is submitted to the detector. Background traffic is created by running several HTTP servers 
and several clients repeatedly requesting dynamically created documents of varying size. Several 
anomalies are introduced during VM migration like network and port-scan attacks and Denial-of-Service 
under high and low intensities (see Table 1). Denial-of-Service attacks are realized using LOIC (an open 
source network stress testing tool). Experiments are characterized by background traffic and anomaly 
type. Expectation Maximization (EM) for Gaussian Mixture Model (EM-GMM) is employed as a 
conventional, parametric method for anomaly detection for the sake of comparison with the proposed 
approached. Indicative detection statistics are illustrated in Table 4 for different anomalies as well as for 
different patterns of background traffic. Results are poor and depend upon the selection of feature vectors 
used in the measurements. The log-likelihood is simply the log of the probability density function of the 
Expectation Maximization (EM) mixture model which is used to calculate the anomaly score. The 
parameters of the Gaussian Mixture Models are estimated from traffic measurements corresponding to 
normal network operation. The log-likelihood values versus time stamps for the same data that are used to 
test the proposed algorithm (low intensity net scan - NS) are presented in Fig. 6a (two clusters), Fig. 6.b 
                                                          




(three clusters) and Fig. 6.c (four clusters). The results pertain to non-normalized data. The more clusters 
used to implement the EM-GMM method the less stable is the convergence of the algorithm. Good results 
may be obtained using two clusters (solid red line) for the general case. Values of log-likelihood below a 
certain threshold indicate an anomaly at time t. The corresponding diagrams of True Positive Rate (TPR) 
vs False Positive Rate (FPR) are given in Fig. 12.a. They are extracted from various threshold values 
ranging from -102 to -104. Anomaly detection using non-parametric data density for the same set of 
experimental data (low intensity net scan - NS) is presented in Fig. 6.d (one cluster) and Fig. 6.e (four 
clusters) for one measurement as well as a group of measurements within a sliding window of ten 
timestamps in Fig. 6.f (one cluster) and Fig. 6.g. (four clusters). True Positive Rate (TPR) vs False 
Positive Rate (FPR) curves are given in Fig. 12.b (for a single measurement) and Fig. 12.c for a group of 
ten consecutive measurements. Normalization of data is carried out as a preprocessing step. Local density 
values per cluster for normal as well as abnormal operation are depicted in Table 5. Low values indicate 
some type of anomaly.  Average local density values per cluster (as defined in Section 3) are illustrated in 
Fig. 7. Detection results do not improve for more than four (4) static clusters determined from 
measurements during normal operation. Additional anomaly detection results using a 10x10 SOFM and 
measurements from a single (cloud) server featuring the number of packets per bin, the number of bytes 
per bin, the number of active flows, the entropies of source IP addresses, the entropies of destination IP 
addresses, the entropy of destination port distribution and the entropy of packet size distribution (as 
indicated in Table 3) are given in Fig. 6.h and in Fig. 12.d (TPR vs. FPR in Fig. 12.d). The Canberra 
distance as defined in Section 4.2 is used to train the SOFM. Detection results are good and support such 
a choice.     
A typical ordering of six samples is given in the sequel in order to test the proposed algorithm under 
similar cloud conditions (for low intensity net scan anomalies). Ordered sets include a feature vector 
(expert DB object) with anomaly measurements at t, where t ranges from 301 to 599 (an attack is 
introduced during Virtual Machine migration after t=300), and five feature vectors (expert DB objects) 
corresponding to normal conditions ordered in ascending distance order (a distributed scenario). The 
feature vector ranked as sixth corresponds to anomalous conditions whereas the five first feature vectors 
correspond to normal conditions. The splitting of the histogram over distance in two parts is indicative of 
an anomaly according to the block diagram in Fig. 1.b. One set of measurements corresponds to outgoing 
traffic from a server during VM migration whereas the other set of measurements corresponds to 
incoming traffic to a server during VM migration (see Figs. 8 for ranking typical feature vectors 
corresponding to single time-stamps for outgoing and incoming traffic). Splitting of the histogram is a 
first indication of an anomaly according to our approach. Nevertheless one has to compare ordered 
sequences of measurements with anomalies against ordered sequences of measurements during normal 
network conditions. A 10x10 SOFM featuring nodes that represent six rank sequences of measurement 
vectors during normal operation is trained using the Canberra distance. The projected maps for the first 
three ranks as well as the attribute planes of the # of bytes vs the # of packets and the entropy of source IP 
addresses vs the # of active flows are illustrated in Figs. 9. Spreading of the distributions from lower to 
higher ranks is observed.  
 
It turned out that the accuracy of the proposed method is increased by taking a window of multiple             
time-stamps and extracting separately histograms for each feature. The number of packets over ten (10) 
consecutive time-stamps is used to construct a histogram of ten bins, the number of bytes is used to 
construct a histogram of twenty bins, the number of active flows is used to construct a histogram of 
fifteen bins, the entropies of source IP addresses is used to construct a histogram of twelve bins and so on 
(see Table 3). Ordering multiple histogram samples (which are obtained as described) using the Canberra 
distance in ascending order is given in Figs. 10 (for low intensity net scan anomalies). The top five 
histograms are indicative of normal network conditions whereas the lower histograms correspond to the 
higher distance and are indicative of an anomaly. The overall histogram over VDM distance for inward 
and outward migration is split in two parts as expected (see Figs. 11). A 10x10 SOFM is used in order to 
cluster ordered histogram samples. We consider sets of multiple feature vectors consisting of six different 
vectors selected at random. The Self-Organizing Feature Map (SOFM) is trained using six feature vectors 
corresponding    to    normal    conditions   ordered   in   ascending distance order. Six multiple histograms 
samples corresponding to normal network conditions (from t to t+9, where t ranges from 1 to 291 in Fig. 
6.i) are ordered using the cumulative Canberra distance for all eight (8) feature histograms (Table 3). A 
total of four hundred multiple histogram samples are used in order to train the SOFM. The sum of all 
elements of the Cross-Order Distance Matrix is used in order to train a SOFM using the Canberra 
distance (i.e. ‘measure’=’Canberra’ and ‘method’=’all’).  The minimum distance from a node of the 
SOFM after training is given in Fig. 6.i for all time stamps (t ranges from 1 to 590). The multiple 
histogram set includes five more samples corresponding to normal conditions. The sum of all elements of 
the Cross-Order Distance Matrix after thresholding is used to obtain the illustrated result, i.e. if 











𝑎𝑏𝑠 (𝑑 (𝑥𝑆(𝑖), 𝑥𝑆
′
(𝑗)) − 𝑑(𝑥𝑆(𝑖), 𝑥𝑆(𝑗))) ≤ 𝑑(𝑥𝑆(𝑖), 𝑥𝑆(𝑗)) 
the corresponding element (VDM) of the Cross-Order Distance Matrix is set to zero (this thresholding 
rule is used to obtain the values in Table 2a as well). The ratio of True Positive Rate vs False Positive 
Rate is evaluated by taking different thresholds and assuming that a value higher than the threshold 
indicates an anomaly (see Fig. 12.e). A SOFM featuring more nodes yields better results in real world 
scenarios since local clusters of multidimensional measurements are better represented, nevertheless 
detection improvements are minor in the artificial experiments which are presented in this paper. 
Anomaly detection results using a 4x4 SOFM according to the proposed approach for ordered sets of 
measurements for different anomaly types (Host port scan, Netport post scan, net scan and UDP Denial-
of-service (UDoS) yield very good results for our experimental setup (see Figs. 13) for mixed training 
scenarios (histograms of attributes within a sliding of ten time stamps for distributed measurements at six 
network points).       
 
SOFMs are based upon unsupervised clustering and render the inherent structure of data without regard of 
specific models for the density function (PDFs) of the parameters. Our approach assumes that each node 
represents a separate PDF of distributed variables (a subset of the total measurements) that indicate 
normal network operation. The setup assumes a null hypothesis test Ho, where an anomaly is detected if 
the distribution of a subset of measurements is significantly different from the distributions corresponding 
to the nodes of the trained SOFM. The SOM method can be viewed as a non-parametric regression 
technique. Much like a regression plane being an abstraction of the original data, the proposed SOM of 
ordered sequences generates a non-linear representation of the multiple data distributions (the universe of 
a hybrid system). Thresholding using different measures defined upon a Cross-Order Distance Matrix 
may be regarded as a non-parametric inference method using generalized statistics. Cross-Order Matrices 
are directly related to cross-classification tables of preprocessed (i.e. ordered) data. 
7   Conclusion   
Anomalies are classified according to their type and intensity. A novel hybrid system approach for 
detecting anomalies during typical cloud operation is proposed (see Fig. 1.b). The proposed method is 
based upon ordering histogram feature vectors from several monitoring sites of the network and using 
them to train a SOFM (which supports the inference logic of the expert system). Each node of the SOFM 
represents a granule of information. A conventional Expectation Maximization Gaussian Mixture Model 
(EM-GMM) as well as a non-parametric data density approach are used for anomaly detection for 
comparison purposes. The proposed approach yields better results. An anomaly is detected should the 
minimum distance from some node of the SOFM exceed a specified threshold. Estimation of the 
distances between the nodes of the SOFM and the ordered set (which contains a feature vector with 
anomaly measurements) is carried out according to a “method” applied upon the so-called Cross-Order 
Distance Matrix. One has to specify a certain distance measure - like the Canberra distance, which is used 
in the context of this work - in order to estimate the similarity of histograms of feature values within a 
sliding time window. Rough set measures can be used along with the Cross-Order Distance Matrix and 
SOFM training. Rough set membership functions are determined as well during training along with the 
14 
 
nodes of the SOFM. The proposed approach yields the server-under-attack and the existence of a network 
anomaly at the same time since a subspace cluster involves certain servers of the cloud. The direct 
analogy of local histograms over the aggregate ordering distance and value-difference metrics (VDM) is 
investigated. The so-called Neighborhood-based Outlier Factor (NOOF) is defined for reduced/aggregate 
ordered sets featuring attributes of different types. 
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Table 1. Typical cyber-attack methods that generate anomaly states within IT systems 
 
Anomaly  Definition 
ALPHA Unusually high rate point-to-point 
byte transfer1 
DOS, DDOS (Distributed) Denial of service 
attack against a single victim 
FLASH 
CROWD 
Unusually large demand for 
resource/service emerging from 
common set of sources 
SCAN Scanning a host for a vulnerable 
point (port scan) or scanning the 
network for a target port (network 
scan) 
WORM Self-propagating code that spreads 
across a network 
POINT to 
MULTIPONT 
Distribution of content from one 
server to many servers 
OUTAGE Equipment related events that 
decrease traffic exchange by an 
Origin-Destination  pair 
INGRESS-
SHIFT 
Customer shifts traffic from one 




                                                          
1 Alpha flows are high-rate flows from a single source to a single destination which account for a dominant fraction 
of byte traffic. These can be distinguished from DoS and DDoS attacks, which feature a dominant fraction of packet 


















































Table 2a. Distances between the three (3) partially overlapping distributions in Fig. 3a used as an example (mean values and variance 
intrerval of ten instances of ordered sequences featuring forty vectors – mean distance between instances of the same distribution should 
be the lowest)  
























































































 sum of all 
elements 
trace thresholded 
sum of all 
elements 
trace thresholded 




Table 2b. Distances between the three (3) partially overlapping distributions in Fig. 3a used as an example 
(rough set fuzzification of the cross distance matrix using elements of low {1-16}, medium {12-28} and high 
order {24-40} intervals within the brackets are defined upon the sum of all distances between pairs of elements in 
relative subsets of both distributions)  
    Distribution A  Distribution B Distribution C 
Distribution A 
µA
low ([0.67  0.84])=1  µA
low,medium ([1.08  1.30])=1  µA
low,high ([1.72  2.02])=1   
                                    µA
medium ([1.22  1.52])=1  µA
medium,high ([1.83  2.18])=1 
                                                                                      µA












low ([2.00  3.11])=1  µB
low,medium ([3.33 4.54])=1  µB
low,high ([5.27   7.17])=1 
µB
medium ([3.81  5.28])=1  µB
medium,high ([5.54  7.66])=1 
µB









low ([1.47  2.03])=1  µC
low,medium ([2.45  3.01])=1  µC
low,high ([3.93  5.24])=1 
µC
medium ([2.85  3.57])=1 µC
medium,high ([4.12  5.49])=1 
µC

























































Centers of histogram bins 
Number of packets 
x10,000) 
404   984   1,563   2,142   2,722   3,301  3,880           4,460  
5,039  5,618   6,198   6,777  7,356 7,936   8,515  9,094   
9,674   10,253   10,832  11,412 (20 bins)  
Number of bytes 
3,787    4,975    6,162    7,350    8,538    9,726    10,914   
12,102  13,289  14,477 15,665  16,853    18,040    19,228     
20,416  (15 bins) 
Number of active flows in 
time stamp 
283.5   354.4   425.3  496.2   567.1   638  709  779.9   
850.8   921.7   992.6   1,063.5                 (12 bins) 
Entropy of source IP 
address distribution 2.4423    2.6608    2.8792    3.0978                 (4 bins) 
Entropy of destination IP 
address distribution 3.0266    3.6158    4.2050    4.7942    5.3834 (5 bins) 
Entropy of source port 
distribution 2.9906    3.5558    4.1210    4.6862    5.2514 (5 bins) 
Entropy of destination port 
distribution 
3.1532   3.8196    4.4860    5.1524    5.8188 (5 bins) 
Entropy of packet size 
distribution 
3.1231    3.7693    4.4155    5.0617    5.7079 (5 bins) 
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Table 5. Anomaly detection using local data densities (typical values per cluster) vs the number of 
clusters for the method depicted in Fig. 2.d (low values indicate anomalies) 





0.9922    
0.9954     0.9928   
0.9964     0.9921 0.9983  





      0.0091    
0.9780 0.0064   
0.9752 0.0056 0.9854  
0.9855 0.9712 0.9749 0.0048 
Background traffic with high anomaly intensity 





                                                          Error rate 55.89% 55.06% 
                                                   Detection rate 44.11% 44.94% 
Background traffic with low anomaly intensity 
(host port scan) 
  
                                                          Error rate 50.13% 50.33% 
                                                   Detection rate 49.87% 49.67% 
Background traffic with low anomaly intensity 
(denial of service-anomaly directed at migrated host) 
  
                                                          Error rate       69.42% 0.4887 
                                                   Detection rate 30.58% 51.13% 
Background traffic with low anomaly intensity 
(denial of service-anomaly directed at static host) 
  
                                                          Error rate 35.41% 26.76% 
                                                   Detection rate 64.59% 73.24% 
Background traffic with high anomaly intensity 
(denial of service-anomaly directed at migrated host) 
  
                                                          Error rate 57.26% 26.79% 
                                                   Detection rate 42.74% 73.21% 
Background traffic with high anomaly intensity 
(denial of service-anomaly directed at static host) 
  
                                                          Error rate 55.56% 53.71% 
                                                   Detection rate 44.44% 46.29% 
Background traffic with high anomaly intensity 
(network port scan) 
  
                                                          Error rate 13.40% 27.44% 
                                                   Detection rate 86.60% 72.56% 
Background traffic with low anomaly intensity 
(network port scan) 
  
                                                          Error rate 48.81% 35.04% 








































Sample cloud network at N points. 
\/ 
Extract structured information for each set of measurements 
corresponding to sampling locations, i.e. windowed 
histograms of scalar measurements, local distributions of 
binary-hex data                                                                                        
(IP addresses and ports) 
\/ 
Arrange N sets of structured data as an ordered sequence of 
local sets. 
\/ 
Apply simple tests upon  the outliers of the ordered 
sequence in order to determine if some set of local 
measurements suggest abnormal network conditions (rule 
based). 
\/ 
Match ordered sequence of local sets of measurements with 
the nodes of a trained SOFM suggesting normal operation 
conditions at all sampling points. SOFM nodes indicate 
global knowledge within the DB of the expert system.  
\/ 
Detect an anomaly should a specified threshold be exceeded. 
 
Fig. 1.b Block diagram of the proposed approach based upon ordered local sets of measurements per 
cluster site, SOFM clustering and thresholding  
 
 
        Fig. 2.a A mixture of Gaussians may be used to cluster measurements indicating normal network 
operation - Anomalies are detected as outliers using log likelihood distance 
 
Fig. 2.b Local data densities of groups of points indicating anomalies (denoted as A) with respect to 























Fig. 2.c Anomaly detection (using local data densities of groups of points (training is carried out 
during normal network operation) – Thresholds for index da which ranges from zero to one 
 




Fig. 3b Histogram over distance for Distribution A (o) Fig. 3a (20 points) 
 
 






























Fig. 6.a Log likelihood (EM-GMM for two Gaussians) vs time stamp (an attack is introduced during 
Virtual Machine migration after t=300) 
 
Fig. 6.b Log likelihood (EM-GMM for three Gaussians) vs time stamp (an attack is introduced during 







Fig. 6.c Log likelihood (EM-GMM for two, three and four Gaussians) 









  Fig. 6.d Local data density over timestamp (for one measurement and one cluster) -  
Clusters are estimated using the data density criterion (an attack is introduced during Virtual Machine 





Fig. 6.e Local data density over timestamp (for one measurement and four clusters) - 
Clusters are estimated using the data density criterion (an attack is introduced during Virtual Machine 
migration after t=300) 
 
 
Fig. 6.f Local data density over timestamp (sliding window of ten timestamps and one cluster) - 
Clusters are estimated using the data density criterion (an attack is introduced during Virtual Machine 





Fig. 6.g Local data density over timestamp (sliding window of ten timestamps and four clusters) - 
Clusters are estimated using the data density criterion (an attack is introduced during Virtual Machine 






Fig. 6.h Closest Canberra distances from a 10x10 SOFM used to 
cluster single vectors of measurements (an attack is introduced during 




Fig. 6.i Outlier distance (proposed method) vs time stamp                                                           






Fig. 7 Average values of local data density per cluster for normal (solid line) as well as abnormal 







Fig. 8a Distances vs rank of elements – 6th rank element corresponds to anomaly (single-stamp feature 





Fig. 8b Number of objects (sets of local measurements) over aggregate distance as a histogram – 6th rank 
corresponds to anomaly (single stamp feature vectors, background traffic with low anomaly intensity - net 








Fig. 8c Number of objects (sets of local measurements) over aggregate distance as a histogram – 6th rank 
corresponds to anomaly (single stamp feature vectors, background traffic with low anomaly intensity - net 
scan - and outward migration)   
  
Fig. 9a SOM projected upon the plane of the # of 
bytes vs the # of packets for 1st  rank vector  
Fig. 9b SOM projected upon the plane of the 
entropy of source IP addresses vs the # of active 
flows for 1st  rank vector 
  
Fig. 9c SOM projected upon the plane of the # of 
bytes vs the # of packets for 2nd  rank vector 
Fig. 9d SOM projected upon the plane of the 
entropy of source IP addresses vs the # of active 
flows for 2nd  rank vector 
 
 
Fig. 9e SOM projected upon the plane of the # of 
bytes vs the # of packets for 3rd  rank vector 
Fig. 9f SOM projected upon the plane of the 
entropy of source IP addresses vs the # of active 












Fig. 10a Histograms of features for a ten (10) stamp sliding window for ordered sets of local 
measurements (background traffic with low anomaly intensity - net scan - and inward migration)     









Fig. 10b Histograms of features for a ten (10) stamp sliding window for ordered sets of local 
measurements (background traffic with low anomaly intensity - net scan - and outward migration) 
 from left to right # of packets, # of bytes, # of active flows, entropy of source IP addresses, entropy of 




Fig. 11a Distances vs rank of elements – 6th rank corresponds to anomaly 
(for the histogram feature vectors depicted in Fig. 9.a - red circles corresponding to inward migration - 
and Fig. 9.b - green circles corresponding to outward migration) 
 

















Fig. 12.a  True Positive Rate (TPR) vs False Positive Rate (FPR) for low 
intensity net scan (EM-GMM using EM-GMM for two (solid red), three 





Fig. 12.b  True Positive Rate vs False Positive Rate for anomaly detection using data density for one 
measurement-timestamp - low intensity net scan (solid red line four clusters, dashed blue three clusters, 





Fig. 12.c  True Positive Rate vs False Positive Rate for anomaly detection using data density for a sliding 
window of ten timestamps - low intensity net scan (solid red line four clusters, dashed blue three clusters, 





Fig. 12.d  True Positive Rate (TPR) vs False Positive Rate (FPR)                    
for anomaly detection using a 10x10 SOFM to cluster single vectors of 
measurements - low intensity net scan (an attack is introduced during 
Virtual Machine migration after t=300, closest distances from the SOFM 







Fig. 12.e  True Positive Rate (TPR) vs False Positive Rate (FPR) for 
anomaly detection using ordered vectors of histograms - low intensity net 









Fig. 13.a  Outlier distance for anomaly detection 
(high intensity Network Port Scan) using ordered 
vectors of histograms over a sliding window of then 
timestamps (a set of three ordered vectors for a 4x4 
neural network) 
Fig. 13.b  True Positive Rate (TPR) vs False 
Positive Rate (FPR) for anomaly detection (high 
intensity Network Port Scan) using ordered 
vectors of histograms over a sliding window of 
then timestamps (a set of three ordered vectors 





Fig. 13.c  Outlier distance for anomaly detection 
(high intensity UPD Denial of Dervice) using 
ordered vectors of histograms over a sliding window 
of then timestamps (a set of three ordered vectors for 
a 4x4 neural network) 
Fig. 13.d  True Positive Rate (TPR) vs False 
Positive Rate (FPR) for anomaly detection (high 
intensity UDP Denial of Service) using ordered 
vectors of histograms over a sliding window of 
then timestamps (a set of three ordered vectors 
for a 4x4 neural network) 
